The challenges of modernity in Iran

In this short paper we will examine the challenges posed by modernity to the traditional society in Iran, in particular in the period ranging from the 19th century to the present days. For this we will examine the elements of the three patterns, namely secularism, religious reform and traditionalism that impacted Iranian society and how they lay the ground for the success of the fourth one, fundamentalism. Our argument is that the fundamentalism that dominates Iran nowadays, is both a counter reaction to the successive reforms/revolutions and the external or internal threads that Iran had to face over the last centuries, and can be seen  as a factor of a cultural and political influence .To illustrate our argument we will refer to some examples from the long period of successive of reforms and revolutions that have shaken Iran over the last two hundred years. In the first paragraph, we will examine the central element of challenges of modernity, in the following paragraph we will review each pattern in relation to examples from Iranian recent history and as conclusion we will summarize our findings and the correlation we can establish with the current situation.  

On modernity threads for traditional society, in our example Iran: first the concept that modernity and religion are exclusive patterns are a classical argument in the western society, meanwhile we should examine this in the context of Muslim societies where there is no such clear separation of the secular and the spiritual spheres (that is after all quite recent in the western democracies), so we should specifically ask how the values of modernity have influence Iran, and be accepted or rejected in this Muslim society. We will examine this in the next chapter, but we can already see clear patterns across their history: "modernist" reforms were top-down movements, often with support from abroad; "modernist" reforms were lacking of a clear strategy and strong leadership; then in at least two occasions (see video 5.3 on the constitutional revolution of 1905-1911, and video 5.4 on the nationalist reforms of Mossadegh 1951-1953) key reforms  were crushed by foreign interventions; and finally modernist reforms have to be analyzed in the context of the great games where Iran was involved (first the Russian/British Empires rivalry, second the British/German/Russian-Soviet rivalry , and third the US-Soviet rivalry) with the strategic position and latter the  raw resources of Iran at stake. This can explain that modernization of the country was not under the best auspices but the transition from a religious Muslim society into a civil Muslim society is a possibility and could occur, even with authoritarian regime as we have seen with the example of Turkey under Ataturk (see D;Eickelman Islam and the Languages of Modernity in MIT Vol. 129, No. 1, Winter, 2000 ) , however  the lack of vision of Iranian leaders and the tragic end of the reformists (Reza Shah in 1944, his son Mohammed in 1980 or Mossadegh in 1953) but also the lack of support of elites and the weakness of the armed forces to support reformism doomed this possible evolution. 

As we examine patterns that could have shaped Iran, we see successive failures or blocking points to change the nature of the society. Religious reformism is itself a difficult road for Iran that represents on its own a minority in the Muslim world surrendered by Sunnis countries that had always difficult and conflictual relations with Iran, that is perceived as a former hegemonic power but also a religious rival. This foreign threads could only lead to a reinforcement of the conservatism and radicalization of the religious beliefs. Some attempts towards secularism were attempted, a very close movement to was we saw in Turkey can be illustrated by the social revolution of 1905-1911; at a time were Russia was weak (the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905 was mobilizing their attention), the British influence had a positive influence and helped reformists, but as soon as the foreign powers had concluded a new alliance they were doomed, again we can see a forced "westernization" in the 1950-1970 period but combined with corruption, political errors and authoritarism this lead to a revolution supported by the clergy and most parts of the political opposition. The traditionalism seems to represent a id term in the Iranian context but if we remember the many foreign interventions that influence the political life of Iran and the 1980's when the revolution take its roots (and from which legitimacy was reinforced by the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988 that became part of the mythology ) , the more fundamentalist part of the movement was reinforced. It appears as a protector against the Sunnite (Saddam Hussein played also the card of the Arab leader against the Persian enemy) and the western values. This fundamentalism translated into many aspects of the society and can be illustrated through examples: the religious police (Mutaween), the division of the armed forces between the regular army and the Guardians of Islamic Revolution , the legal and political role of the Shiia clergy class and the leading role of the Ayatollah in Iran.  

In conclusion, we can see that Iran as handle modernity on their own terms and turn this into another societal model, a model that has an influence outside of their borders, within the political sphere of influence of Shiism (in areas where Shiia minorities or majorities are present) but even further as an anti-western model that could represent or an alternative or an ally to counter western hegemony (North Korea or Venezuela) The paradox is that one of the strongest strategy and political vision in Iran was the fundamentalism developed by Khomeini (see video 5.5 ) in the outcomes of the revolution of 1977. A vision that succeed to gain popular reforms and to extinguish (often with brutality) not only the previous regime but also all political alternatives and became its only legitimate representation. A fundamentalist vision that enforces also the influence of the regime outside of Iran and in return enforce its prestige inside of the borders.